2 in the ongoing military commissions, while announcing that he would spend time developing an answer to the question of what to do with those who had been designated as subject to them. 2 Although as of this date the final reforms to the procedural rules have not yet arrived, the Obama Administration has announced the broad outlines of the reforms that will come. In a terse announcement on May 15, 2009, the Obama Administration announced that it intended to continue the military commissions, although with significant changes to their procedures. 3 The following week the president made a major speech concerning a variety of national security issues that included five distinct changes to the military commissions that he intended to accomplish through statutory amendment or executive order. The administration of President George W. Bush was faced with an immediate series of choices. Initially, President Bush's choices proved to be quite successful. He demanded that the Taliban government of Afghanistan surrender the al Qaeda leadership responsible for the attack. 13 They predictably rebuffed the request. 14 The military action that followed, coupled with the considerable ground forces of the belligerency against the Taliban known as the Northern Alliance, 15 quickly resulted in opposing forces falling into the custody of the United
States. 16 As the Taliban government appeared to dissolve, the President issued an order outlining his plan for dealing with them: detention under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and possible trial before military commissions. , at A 1. 16 Although people were originally held at facilities in Afghanistan, by the end of the year the Department of Defense had decided to bring many to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for detention. U.S.
Targets 150 War Captives for Inquiries, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 2001 , at 3. 17 Military Order, supra note 1.
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The history of military commissions is lengthy, and others have explained it thoroughly and well. 18 The noteworthy fact about the Military Order of November 16, 2001, was that it left open most of the significant questions bound to arise from the resuscitation of this unusual forum.
Their level of openness, the nature of the offenses and offenders they would try, and their similarity to modern courts-martial, were all questions unanswered by the President's proclamation. Academics and commentators from all sides had to speculate on the answers until the President and Secretary of Defense began to announce them.
The choices actually made, this paper will argue, did far more harm than good. Part II will consider the government's choices concerning publicity. Initially, the Bush Administration located the tribunals, as they had the detentions, in a narrow-strip of U.S.-controlled land on a hostile island. This built into the process a set of difficulties that inevitably served to reduce their visibility. Further decisions, intended to increase security, only served to decrease further the openness of the tribunals to the world. There is no evidence that the Administration ever took seriously the possible public relations function of trials by military commissions, a function that ironically had been paramount at Nuremberg. 19 The resulting perception of secrecy proved to be a burden that the commissions probably could never have overcome, no matter what other choices had been made.
Other choices, though, made the problem worse. A series of early, and odious, policy decisions appeared to commit the United States to a startling embrace of torture. Although "torture" was repeatedly and roundly denounced by the leaders of the Bush Administration, simultaneous commitment to "enhanced interrogation techniques" coupled with a refusal to define the term, heightened suspicion that the government of the United States was behaving dishonorably with the persons under its control. Part III will briefly discuss this controversy.
The significant moment of intersection between coercive interrogation and the military commissions' story came in a legislative choice that seems both pointless and potentially disastrous. The congressional decision to comply with the Administration's request to define 7 excludable evidence before the military commissions in a particularly narrow way tainted the proceedings by its presence, even should it never operate.
A final odd choice was the nature of offenses and offenders to be tried by the tribunals.
Although in some regards the Bush military commissions were significantly narrower than their predecessors, in one way they greatly expanded the traditional jurisdiction of those tribunals.
The determination to focus simultaneously on unlawful combatant offenses as well as traditional war crimes was unusual, and probably unwise. The further decision to seek to punish inchoate offenses connected to unlawful combatancy was, Part IV will argue, unprecedented. The President made clear that he did not simply intend to continue the status quo, however.
Instead, he announced broad areas where he believed reform was needed to bring the military commissions into compliance with domestic and international law. 25 Among these were to be a prohibition on evidence derived from cruel, inhuman, or degrading techniques, an alteration in the hearsay burden of persuasion, and increased counsel choices for those on trial. 26 Whether these reforms will be enough to save the military commissions remains to be seen. documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed people. No history of this era can be entitled to authority which fails to take into account the record of Nurnberg [Nuremberg] . While an effort was made by Goering and others to portray themselves as "glowing patriots," their admitted crimes of violence and meanness, of greed and graft, leave no ground for future admiration of their characters and their fate leaves no incentive to emulation of their examples.
II. Openness
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In short, openness was not merely a feature of the military tribunals at Nuremberg: openness was one of its primary goals. The role of witnessing Nazi atrocities both to the current world and the unknown future were in the forefront of every decision made by the Allies in constructing the trial process. 50 At one of the trials following that of the major war criminals, known collectively as the Subsequent Proceedings, a reporter noted the presence of almost one hundred German spectators daily, including "many will be permitted, there remains always the possibility that the change in location will prompt a change in that policy as well.
III. An Absence of Coercion
A second question arose from the juxtaposition of the hooded-detainee photos, the Abu 97 The scenario most frequently relied upon to defend the perceived necessity for torture is the hypothetical situation in which a terrorist has planted a bomb somewhere in a city before falling into the hands of the nation's security forces. Those forces must then weigh their respect for the bodily integrity of the terrorist against their duty to safeguard the population. worsens the character of those who conduct it, 100 who become hardened to human pain before returning to American society. It is also astoundingly unreliable, and we must retain the memory that that torture makes people talk, but it does not necessarily make them tell the truth. 101 In an insurgency-where the use of torture by one side will inevitably harden the resistance of the other-it will predictably serve as a recruiting tool for the insurgents.
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The It is in this area that the world most sees the power of the Executive Branch. In a single sentence, President Obama cleaned up this area by announcing that the ban on the use of evidence derived from torture would now extend to all statements gained through coercive techniques. 112 In that single sentence, the President insulated the military commissions from future debates over whether particular techniques were torture or "merely" cruel, inhuman, or degrading. 113 Such discussions show no signs of abating soon, but no longer is the use of particular evidence a prize to be won through victory in such a battle. Whether torture or "mere" cruelty, the products of such interrogations are now no more useful for a military commission trial than for one in federal court.
111 Jackson, supra note 52.
112 Obama, On National Security, supra n. 4 ("We will no longer permit the use of evidence --as evidence statements that have been obtained using cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation methods"). 113 A simple change to Mil. Com. R. Evid. 304, whether directed by Congress or the President, will accomplish this result. 133 "Modern warfare is directed at the destruction of enemy war supplies and the implements of their production and transportation quite as much as at the armed forces," id. at 37.
26
IV. Trying Only One Kind of Criminal
134 Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 136 One of the specifications against the saboteurs had charged them with seeking "to destroy certain war industries, war utilities and war materials within the United States'" which was "contrary to the law of war" in part because the accused were "in civilian dress," id. at 36. 137 Although they were not members of the Marine Infantry whose uniforms they wore, the German government had trained and funded the saboteurs before transporting them in German submarines to the United people of good will everywhere. They might, like their predecessors at Nuremberg, have become trials of major war criminals. 165 See discussion of General Sawada, supra note 119. 166 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (noting that it was the fact of combatants being "without uniform" that "renders their belligerency unlawful"). 167 Their weapons fire that led to the air strikes, Shephard, supra note 159. 168 Indeed, it requires little imagination to foresee such a standard being turned against American military personnel. A future enemy need merely declare that the United States is not a proper party to the conflict, and U.S.
soldiers are therefore subject to trial for ordinary acts of combat.
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To date, there is no evidence that the current Administration views the distinction of bad acts war crimes and status offenses in any way significantly different from their predecessor.
Nothing in the White House speeches or announcements suggests any pulling back from jurisdiction over status offenses in the commissions. 169 This is unfortunate, but it is not unalterable. The administration might at any time announce that the United States will no longer try cases in which the only offense is the lack of status. Alternatively, the government could make no such announcement, but simply dismiss cases like those involving Omar Khadr. This would focus the energy of the tribunals on those whose alleged acts make their status irrelevant, such as the Guantanamo five. Either way, the commissions would be restored to a Nuremberg model.
V. Conclusion
Three choices, three errors. The decisions that the Bush Administration rejected, to hold truly open trials, to reject utterly coerced evidence, and to limit the jurisdiction to bad acts offenses, might have radically altered the story of the military commissions in the conflict with al Qaeda. The commissions have been fitful things, notoriously stopping and starting, and offering a bewildering array of procedural difficulties in a bewildering array of cases. 170 The one consistent thing about them was bad publicity. Because of their limited access, the overhanging nemesis of torture, and the spectacle of grand proceedings for petty crimes, they never really told the world the story of the wrongfulness of al Qaeda. 169 Indeed, the fact that the Khadr case has continued with battles over representation indicates a seeming lack of interest by the Administration in removing this category of offenses from the purview of the military 
38
The greatest possible benefit of military commissions was the objective that remained most firmly out of reach. By focusing on the perceived cruelty, secrecy, and unfairness of the United States, both critics and friends missed the real story: a handful of men accused of planning one of the most outrageous acts in world history had been captured. Those men, advocates of an ideology that openly advocated the killing of innocents to achieve their grand aims, might have been shown to the world as they are. A global audience might have watched as families members of the very international group of victims of the attack on the World Trade Center told of their losses. 171 Viewers from around the globe might have listened to experts discussing the ideas, both clever and the loathsome, contained in al Qaeda manuals 172 and materials found at scattered sites around the world, from Afghanistan 173 to Britain. 174 The world might have listened in rising horror to the stories of destruction in places as diverse as a nightclub in Bali 175 and a wedding in Jordan. 176 The continuing tragedy is that such trials never happened. Choices designed to gain convictions rather than teach a global audience meant that the monstrous nature of al Qaeda has never appeared before the world. Instead, what the world saw was a superpower with a handful of "broken and discredited men" in its custody. These men were seen not like the wicked Nazis in the dock at Nuremberg, but as hooded and isolated fellow humans, separated by threat of 171 Citizens of more than ninety countries died in the al Qaeda attacks of September 11 th torture from any evidence of their wrongdoing. Thus the victim became the villain, and those facing trial have too often been objects of pity rather than condemnation.
Is it, then, too late? It may well be. Numerous commentators have long ago given up on any notion of fairness or justice from the military commissions. 177 Although commentators have no legal standing, their analysis may well inform the view taken of the enterprise by the federal courts that will invariably hear the habeas challenges following any guilty verdicts in restarted military commissions. 178 The reforms mentioned by President Obama will play some role in convincing skeptics, but may never be enough to restore enough of a sense of regularity and legitimacy to the commissions to enable them to survive.
It is possible that the only course that might salvage the commissions at this point is internationalization. Nuremberg had been an international military tribunal, and from that fact may have gained a certain built-in legitimacy. Much of the unease about military commissions stems from the fact that they are irregular courts, created for this specific purpose. Intriguingly, although exactly the same charge could be laid at various international tribunals, it virtually never is. 179 Part of the reason is the obvious practical one: until the advent of the International
